What's Blocking the Sun?: Solar Photovoltaics for the U.S. Commercial Market by Jenna Goodward
W O R K I N G  P A P E R
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE   •   10 G Street, NE  •   Washington, DC 20002  •   Tel: 1-202-729-7600  •   Fax: 1-202-729-7610  •   www.wri.org 
World Resources Institute Working Papers contain 
preliminary research, analysis, fi ndings, and 
recommendations. They are circulated to stimulate timely 
discussion and critical feedback and to infl uence ongoing 
debate on emerging issues. Most working papers are 
eventually published in another form and their content may 
be revised.
Suggested citation: Goodward, Jenna. “What’s Blocking the Sun? 
Solar Photovoltaics for the U.S. Commercial Market”. WRI Work-
ing Paper. World Resources Institute, Washington DC. Available 
online at http://www.wri.org.
April 2010
What’s Blocking the Sun? 
Solar Photovoltaics for the U.S. Commercial Market
JENNA GOODWARD
CONTENTS
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
II. Hurdles (and Hurdle Rates) for 
Commercial Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
III. Unblocking the Sun: Emerging Solutions  . . . . . . 12 
IV. Concluding with Strategic Actions 
and Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The commercial sector of the U.S. economy is in a unique position to drive 
growth in the solar photovoltaic (PV) market, widening it geographically as 
well as increasing its total size. The retailers, multinational companies, and 
small businesses that occupy commercial real estate in the United States 
make up 36 percent of national electricity consumption. The roof print of 
these businesses is vast and suitable for installing solar PV at scale. These 
potential investors are increasing their attention to the risks of climate 
change and seeking investment solutions that can meet their growing power 
demands as well as their sustainability mandates. However, more than 90 
percent of commercial PV capacity installed is concentrated in only fi ve 
states. Beyond pioneers in a few key states, why have more businesses not 
found solar PV to be the solution? Over the past year, our team interviewed 
members of WRI’s Climate and Business Projects in order to understand 
the experiences of businesses exploring or participating in solar PV 
markets; those interviews inform this working paper. 
This paper provides a snapshot of the current investment environment for 
solar PV in the United States from the commercial end user’s point of view. 
The current installation trends, policy landscape, and economics are 
described in detail. Solar PV installations are concentrated in states with 
strong fi nancial incentives and no regulatory barriers to distributed genera-
tion. Commercial investments have fared worse than the residential market 
during the economic downturn of the past two years. The policy landscape 
has improved since 2008, but multiple regulatory barriers remain at the 
state level and federal support is less certain after 2010.
An analysis of the hurdles remaining for solar PV fi nds that they are both 
economic and regulatory. The economics of a PV system is modeled in 
detail for four U.S. states, showing the potential impact of lower module 
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costs as well as state and federal policies on the levelized 
cost of solar power. PV has not yet reached cost parity with 
traditional power generation without a price on carbon, but 
its costs are expected to continue to decline and to eventu-
ally reach grid parity. The evolution of new business 
models and support policies is needed to stimulate deploy-
ment and accelerate this transition. Solutions are discussed 
that have the potential to “unblock” investment in this 
sector, including regulatory reform, demand aggregation, 
new fi nancing mechanisms and public R&D investment. 
With the objective of expanding the commercial market for 
solar PV, we make 18 strategic recommendations for solar 
industry members, commercial energy end users, and 
policy makers. Recognizing that the PV industry is in a 
highly dynamic phase and that these are only a few of the 
solutions that could put it on a sustainable path to grid 
parity, we conclude with questions for further research. At 
the end of this paper, there is a survey containing three sets 
of key questions, each targeted to different stakeholders.
In publishing this working paper, WRI seeks not just to 
recommend strategic actions but to elicit and synthesize 
additional insights about how to scale up solar PV. We 
hope that the reader will take a moment to access and 
respond to our survey online: http://www.wri.org/publica-
tion/whats-blocking-the-sun. Your confi dential responses 
will provide insights for our upcoming work, informing 
future initiatives and outreach to the audiences best 
positioned to unblock the sun and grow the commercial PV 
market. 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, PV systems have steadily become 
less expensive and more economically viable, thanks to a 
serious decline in panel prices as well as reductions in 
associated installation costs.1 As costs come down, major 
commercial energy users are starting to explore investment 
in rooftop solar PV generation. Companies in the United 
States and abroad are attracted to the idea of a clean, local 
source of energy that would help meet peak loads and 
reduce electricity bills. These major electricity consumers 
have thousands of facilities worldwide and vast roof space 
that could host solar PV systems. They are actively seeking 
opportunities to make solar PV projects work across their 
U.S. and global operations and are starting to make 
investments. However, in many regions, current PV 
economics do not satisfy the terms that most corporate 
energy managers consider viable for large-scale invest-
ment. Additional market and regulatory barriers also 
currently limit the potential for PV deployment.
The commercial sector—from Fortune 500 companies to 
real estate managers to small businesses—has an important 
and unique role to play in the deployment of PV at a scale 
that moves U.S. electricity generation measurably closer to 
being zero emissions. The commercial sector represents 36 
percent of U.S. electricity consumption, and occupies 
commercial real estate that is better suited to large-scale 
PV installations than the residential sector.2 At the same 
time, such installations are still a distributed form of 
generation, rather than centralized power plants. This 
avoids many of the transmission issues that hinder central-
ized renewables and also brings stability and effi ciency 
benefi ts to the entire power grid. Additionally, commercial 
investors have access to the large amounts of capital 
needed to build gigawatts of PV capacity, if the economics 
can meet their investment requirements.
This working paper explores the potential for investment in 
solar PV by the commercial sector, with a focus on the 
investment and policy environment in the United States. 
Over the past year, our team interviewed several members 
of WRI’s Climate and Business Projects in order to 
understand the experiences of businesses exploring or 
participating in solar PV markets (see Box 1). Based on 
discussions with the private sector, this working paper 
discusses barriers that hold back broader and more rapid 
market growth. It highlights potential solutions that could 
be used to increase the deployment of the technology, and 
recommends “next steps” for key stakeholders in the 
private and public sectors. We end with a survey for 
readers, soliciting feedback on additional research ques-
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tions in order to inform future initiatives and develop 
public-private dialogue on the solutions for this sector.
Photovoltaic Installation Trends 
Grid-connected solar PV installations in the United States 
grew on average 71 percent3 annually from 2000-2008, 
totaling 1,102 megawatts (MW) by the end of 2008.4 
However, the highly concentrated U.S. PV market is 
dominated by only a handful of states with strong 
incentives: The top six states in terms of installed MW 
host 90 percent of total capacity.5 Nonresidential PV 
installations (i.e. on commercial and public buildings) are 
even more concentrated, with over 90 percent in just fi ve 
states.6 The growth picture for commercial installations 
was clouded by economic distress in 2009. Whereas in 
2009 annual grid-connected PV installations grew 40 
percent compared with installations in 2008, installations 
for the commercial sector remained roughly the same as 
in 2008.7
The leading states in commercial end-user installations are 
largely the same as the leaders on the map of total installed 
capacity shown in Figure 1 (compare the rankings in Table 
A in Appendix I). Arizona is a minor exception (fi fth 
overall but eighth in commercial installations) due to a few 
large utility-scale projects, resulting from somewhat 
different policies. A comparison of PV installation by state 
with technical potential (solar insolation) by states quickly 
shows that the strength of the solar resource alone is not a 
reliable indicator of where capacity is installed. Instead, 
installation patterns confi rm that the drivers of solar PV 
installation are state incentives, electricity prices, and 
renewable portfolio standards. The sunniest states in Figure 
1 do not, as a group, lead in solar PV investment; among 
Box 1 | WRI Climate and Business Project Partners
For ten years, WRI has engaged more than 60 companies through the U.S. Climate Business Group (Climate Northeast, Climate 
Midwest, and Climate Southeast*), the Green Power Market Development Group, and the California Affiliates program. These 
partnerships have advanced strategies for companies to thrive in a carbon-constrained economy. Peer-to-peer learning and 
collaborative engagement has helped partners develop innovative approaches to emissions management, develop and market 
climate-friendly products and services, and broaden their understanding of policy and market developments. Partners include:
Acuity Brands
Alcoa Inc.
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
Apple
Archer Daniels Midland Company
Baker & McKenzie
Baxter International
Bristol-Myers Squibb
BT Americas
Caterpillar
Cisco Systems
Citi
The Coca-Cola Company
Con Edison
Delta Airlines
The Dow Chemical Company
Dupont Company
Eastman Kodak Company
eBay
FedEx Corporation
General Electric Company
General Motors
Georgia-Pacific
Google
Great River Energy
Hewlett-Packard
IBM
Intel Corporation
Interface
Intuit
Johnson Controls Inc.
Johnson & Johnson
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Kimberly-Clark
Lenovo
Levi-Strauss & Co.
Michelin North America Inc.
MWV
NatureWorks
Neenah Paper
NewPage Corporation
News Corporation
Northeast Utilities Systems
OfficeMax
Pactiv Corporation
Pfizer 
Pitney Bowes
PPG Industries
Rayonier
Related
Staples
Starbucks Coffee Company
Time Inc.
TOTO USA
Toyota Motor Sales, USA
United Airlines
United Parcel Service (UPS)
United Technologies Corporation 
(UTC)
Wal-Mart Stores
Wells Fargo
Xcel Energy
For more information, visit www.climatenortheast.org, www.climatemidwest.org, www.climate-southeast.org, www.thegreenpowergroup.org.
* WRI co-convenes its Climate Southeast workgroup with Southface Energy Institute. www.southface.org.
** Some of these companies provide financial support to WRI’s climate program in the form of technical fees for project activities. Some are 
funders of other programs within WRI. A full accounting of WRI’s funding sources can be found in our annual report, available online at www.wri.org.
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the top six states in installed capacity are New Jersey and 
New York, which lack exceptional solar resources. Interna-
tionally, Germany leads the world in PV deployment, yet 
has the same solar insolation as Alaska.8 This shows that, 
even where there is only a moderate resource, there are 
many policy levers that can be used to capture the solar 
investment opportunity. 
All of the states with the highest deployment levels (except 
California) have a solar-specifi c renewable portfolio 
standard (solar RPS), as well as state fi nancial incentives. 
In the case of California, the long history of well funded 
incentives for PV preceding even the California Solar 
Initiative (CSI) is very important, but the aggressive 
general RPS, already high power prices and excellent 
insolation help as well.9 Other states with good insolation, 
such as in the Southeast, have not seen similar adoption 
levels. Even some states that have favorable regulatory 
structures for solar (e.g. good net metering and intercon-
nection policies) but fewer incentives, such as New 
Mexico, have had very minimal investment.10 For more 
details about how interconnection, net metering, renewable 
portfolio standards, and incentive policies for solar 
compare state by state, see Appendix I.
Figure 1 | Solar Resource and Installation (Grid-Connected MW) in 2008 by State
Source: This map was created by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory for the Department of Energy. Installation data also from NREL: Doris et al., 2009.
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The Cost of Solar PV Today
The price of solar PV panels (or “modules”) has plum-
meted by about 50 percent globally since 2008, attributable 
in part to slow demand during the economic crisis and to a 
global surplus of silicon.11 This reduction improved 
economics for PV projects but also caused fi nancial losses 
and bankruptcy for some module manufacturers. The 
average sales price of modules has fallen from a peak of 
over $4 per watt in 2008 to about $1.80 per watt in early 
2010, and is expected to continue to drop.12 Lack of 
demand and stale inventories necessitated these price 
reductions; although technological progress also reduced 
real production costs and thereby buffered the pain, the 
revenue impact has been quite signifi cant. To illustrate, 
Sunergy reported that its average per watt sales price fell 
50 percent between the fi rst quarter of 2008 and the fourth 
quarter of 2009, while per watt production costs fell only 
37 percent.13 It remains to be seen how far this downward 
pricing trend continues, especially once global module 
demand picks back up, and what permanent changes it will 
bring to the PV supply market structure. These factors will 
determine the installed module price that commercial end 
users pay in the next one to fi ve years and the future 
viability of PV for commercial on-site investment. 
The most important PV cost metric, the installed price per 
watt (dollars/W), is a function of PV systems’ cost struc-
ture and the specifi c system’s scale. Figure 2 illustrates the 
typical cost structure per installed watt based on 2008 
data.14 Fifty-two percent of the cost is for the module, 
while non-module costs include the inverter, installation 
labor, additional hardware, and general overhead and 
development costs.15 Non-module costs have historically 
declined faster than the cost of the actual panels, but in 
recent years they have leveled off while panel pricing has 
continued to decline.16 
In a perfect market, the dramatically lower module costs 
post-2008 would proportionally reduce the total installed 
all-in cost. However, in practice this depends on whether 
the market is competitive enough to force integrators to 
pass on all of these savings and also on the size of the 
system. Although installed module pricing data are scarce, 
early data from Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) 
show that projects approved (but not yet installed) in 2009 
had average installed costs of $6.10 per watt in California 
and $6.50 per watt in New Jersey.17 This represents a 
signifi cant reduction from 2008 ($2 per watt reduction in 
the case of California, and 70 cents per watt in New 
Jersey). However, these fi gures don’t line up with the cost 
reduction one might expect when the key cost component 
falls by more than 50 percent. Lower pricing, in the $4 per 
watt range, is reported for large projects that enjoy econo-
mies of scale and is in line with lower module costs.18 Such 
$4/W pricing, if it were consistent, would make PV 
competitive in sunny states where there are fi nancial 
incentives and higher than average electricity prices.19 But 
competing with today’s power prices in other sunny states, 
including in the Southeast and Midwest, will require 
further cost reductions and/or incentives to drive solar 
below 10 cents per kWh.
Figure 2 | Cost Structure of a Typical PV System in 2008
Source: LBNL. 2009. Tracking the Sun, Part I.
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Current U.S. Policy Landscape for Solar PV
The renewal of the federal tax credit for PV in 2008 came 
during a period of declining state-level incentives and 
stagnant installed costs. The average subsidy from state 
incentives in 2008 was 50 percent below its peak in 2002 
(per PV watt installed).20 The California Solar Initiative, for 
example, reduces the value of the rebate automatically at 
certain milestones of capacity installed in each utility 
territory to avoid over-subsidizing PV. New Jersey has been 
transitioning away from capacity-based incentives (CBIs), 
which pay a rate per MW installed upfront, and has moved 
toward almost complete reliance on solar Renewable 
Energy Certifi cates (sRECs).21 In late 2008, the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the “bailout bill”) 
extended the 30 percent Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for 
solar through 2016 and also made the tax credit available to 
investor-owned utilities.22 Further improvements were made 
in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), which created the option of receiving the value of 
the tax credit as a cash grant instead. To receive the cash, 
projects must start construction by the end of 2010, apply 
by the end of October 2011, and operate commercially by 
the end of 2016.23 The ARRA also funded a $60 billion loan 
guarantee program for renewable energy and transmission.24 
In the fi rst round of cash grants, the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) announced disbursement of $502 million, 
only $2.7 million of which was won by two PV project 
applicants totaling 520 kW.25 Industry reports indicate that 
the solar market was more depressed than the wind market 
and did not have as many projects ready to apply and 
compete for the cash grant.26
State policies have weathered the fi nancial crisis fairly well 
thus far, with some states using the stimulus money to 
create direct incentive programs for solar. Six state govern-
ments reduced incentive levels, either lowering the payment 
(per kWh or per kW) or reducing the maximum cap, for 
solar in 2009.27 This may have been partially to avoid 
over-subsidizing, given the lower module costs and the 
better federal incentives. The four largest stimulus solar 
budgets were in Tennessee ($62 million), New York ($58 
million), Florida ($45 million), and Arizona ($15 million).28 
There was also broad movement on renewable portfolio 
standards: Eleven states enacted an RPS or made pro-solar 
changes to their existing RPS between September 2008 and 
September 2009. Seven states and Washington, D.C., made 
new provisions specifi c to solar energy. States are increas-
ingly complementing their RPSs with feed-in tariffs, as seen 
recently in California, Vermont, and Oregon.29 
The policy outlook for solar power is much improved 
today from its status in 2008, but some of these recent 
gains are part of the stimulus package that will expire in 
2010. Of the $36.7 billion allocated to DOE by the ARRA, 
about 75 percent ($27.3 billion) of the money is relevant to 
renewable energy and effi ciency implementation and 
research.30 As it stands now, the cash grant administered by 
the Treasury will not be available to systems that start 
construction after December 31, 2010.31 
HURDLES (AND HURDLE RATES) FOR 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT
Cost Remains a Hurdle for Solar PV
In 2009, Ernst and Young conducted a cross-sector corpo-
rate survey of 132 executives in the United States and 
Canada on investment in renewable energy.32 The survey 
found that 5 percent of respondent companies had installed 
on-site renewable energy in some form, but that it was still 
not a high priority for most companies. Business executives 
cited the higher cost of renewable energy as a major barrier 
to their switching over and expressed discomfort with their 
understanding of the logistics of installing renewable energy 
and its actual costs.33 The cost of solar PV electricity has 
fallen, especially in the last two years, but it is still more 
expensive than average utility rates in most states with 
predominantly fossil fuel generation (“brown power”). 
To illustrate how the cost of PV solar electricity varies by 
state and how it is affected by state and federal incentives, 
the author performed a fi nancial analysis of four hypotheti-
cal projects in Ohio, Colorado, New Jersey, and California. 
The baseline results presented in Figure 3 are approximate 
representations of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)34 
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in each state without any incentive. The analysis applies 
normal tax rates specifi c to each state (corporate, sales, and 
property) even in states that grant tax relief to solar 
projects, in order to show the unsubsidized cost. Figure 3 
above shows how the installed cost of the solar panel 
(dollars per watt) drives the cost of solar electricity.35 The 
average 2009 retail prices (cents per kWh) paid for 
electricity in these states by commercial end users were 
9.66 in Ohio, 8.16 in Colorado, 14.47 in New Jersey, and 
14.04 in California.36 These are well below today’s baseline 
cost of solar without incentives, even at the lowest mod-
eled cost of $3 per watt. This highlights the importance of 
continued cost reductions to the module and the balance of 
system in order to make PV a viable investment for 
commercial end users without continued incentives. 
The results in Figure 3 are indicative only and should be 
considered along with their underlying assumptions, which 
are presented along with the methodology in Appendix II. 
Assumptions for the analysis were taken from Bolinger 
(2009)37 and, where appropriate, from the NREL Solar 
Advisor Model.38 
To demonstrate the impact of state and federal policies on 
the current levelized cost for solar electricity, Figure 4 
shows how the LCOE is reduced by three distinct types of 
policy incentives that are available in these four states. The 
assumed cost per installed watt for all three cases shown is 
$4 per watt, and the baseline is again presented without 
incentives (case 1). The state incentive case (case 2) 
includes the effects of any state-specifi c tax relief granted to 
PV as well as available state fi nancial incentives (both 
capacity-based and performance-based). The ITC case (case 
3) includes how the federal ITC further reduces the LCOE 
below the state incentives alone. The value of the state 
Renewable Energy Certifi cate (REC) is added in case 4 and 
Figure 3 | Effect of Installed Module Cost on Levelized 
Cost of Electricity without Incentives, 2010
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Figure 4 | Solar Electricity Costs in Four U.S States 
Including Effects of State and Federal Incentives
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is based on current pricing available, except for Ohio where 
it is assumed that REC prices track the declining Alternate 
Compliance Payment (ACP) schedule at a discount. All 
assumptions are further described in Appendix II.
The prices in Figure 4 are close to what commercial 
investors might expect to pay per kWh if they invested 
directly in a PV system on their own balance sheet, and 
could capture all of the incentives available. However, it is 
important to note that certain incentives are not guaranteed, 
so the developer might still face uncertainty, e.g., a state 
program might not have suffi cient funding to rebate all 
applicants in a year, or certain projects might not qualify. 
Especially for RECs, pricing and the term of the contract 
are powerful but uncertain drivers of the ultimate levelized 
cost.39 Long-term contracts are not always available, so the 
REC values presented here are on the optimistic end. That 
said, it is interesting to note that REC contracts have the 
potential to be especially valuable in Ohio and New Jersey. 
The value of the REC in California and Colorado is lower, 
so projects there may depend relatively more on a variety of 
state incentives and federal tax incentives. In these two 
cases, the value of the state incentive is more certain than 
that of RECs, but does not subsidize solar as strongly.
Performance Needed for Viable 
Commercial Investments
Overlapping Space 
for Negotiation
Current Economics 
for Solar PV 
Payback 5–10 years 5–20+ yearsa
PPA contract 5–20 years; shorter preferred.
5–20 years; 
20 years most commonc
Levelized Cost 
($/MWh)
$65–150/MWh 
depending on the region
$37–400+b 
Figure 5 | Current versus Attractive Terms for Commercial Solar Investments
Additional Parameters Affecting PV Commercial Viability
Incentives Consistently strong, clear, accessible. Strong in some states, non-existent elsewhere.
Regulatory ease 
(permitting, 
interconnection, 
integration)
Consistent and predictable.
Fragmented rules. Ease of interconnection and net 
metering varies widely between states. Building codes 
for PV can vary by city.
RECs
Liquid market with standard contracts and products, 
ability to sign long-term contracts that guarantee and 
additional revenue stream would significantly improve 
PV economics.
REC markets fragmented depending on state, with 
little liquidity or ability to contract forward beyond 3–5 
years in some states. Sometimes held by the utility in 
case of utility rebate incentives, which can make it 
unattractive to use the rebate.d
a. Low range is based on a project purchased outright (“corporate balance sheet model”) assuming $4 per watt in a state with good resources and 
incentives, while the high range represents a scenario with higher costs and limited incentives and would not be undertaken by most rational investors.
b. Low range illustrates a case with aggressive PV pricing (less than $4.50 per watt) and full advantage of federal and New Jersey RECs at good prices.
c. NREL, 2010b 
d. NREL, 2010b
5 20Prefer shorter 5–20 Years 20 Most Common
5 20
5 10
37 400+
65 150
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The expectations of commercial investors are diffi cult to 
characterize in general terms, but Figure 5 is an illustra-
tive indication of acceptable fi nancial terms for solar proj-
ects, as described by four Fortune 500 companies in 
interviews in 2009 and 2010 about their investment 
decisions. Acceptable terms (i.e., return on investment, 
payback period, LCOE) vary based on industry, company 
size, cost of capital, strategic focus, and the company’s 
current power prices. It is clear that there is often still a 
gap between the fi nancial performance of PV projects and 
the expectations of corporate management for good 
investments.
Many energy and facility managers compare the price of 
solar to their average utility rate, which is a comparison that 
overlooks the benefi ts of green power, the value of the 
associated REC, and the value of solar power’s peak-time 
generation. However, companies cannot identify the value 
of distributed peak-time generation when their electricity 
billing structures are extremely complicated and the 
Box 2 | The Power Purchase Agreement Model for Solar PV
The solar power purchase agreement (PPA) provides an option to 
buy power at a fixed price rather than having to invest cash 
directly in a PV system. The PPA model has been revolutionary 
for the solar industry. Under this model, buyers pay only for 
power produced while the solar developer owns the system. In 
some cases, the PPA model has helped make solar purchasing 
feasible for companies that cannot make the direct investment 
themselves (at the terms illustrated in Figure 5). Customers see 
no up-front cost, and avoid all operational risk and operations 
and maintenance responsibility. The PPA also allows efficient use 
of the federal tax credits and easier monetization of sRECs by 
the developer (if the power buyer does not keep them). A single 
rooftop PV system alone is too small to attract the attention of a 
bank. Solar developers who build multiple projects do not have 
the tax appetite for the tax credits, but they can build better 
relationships with the banks that supply tax equity and finance 
several PV projects in one combined tranche. However, solar PPA 
providers are still dependent on the banking industry for their tax 
equity capital, and this presents a challenge. In 2008 and 2009, 
tax equity deals were difficult due to the financial crisis, and the 
expected equity return rose on what is a fairly low-risk invest-
ment. Projects earning federal tax credits can be tested and put 
into operation before the tax equity investor buys in, but 
expected return on investment (ROI) still rose from about 7 
percent to 9 percent, which significantly affected PPA prices.1 
Note
1.  Bolinger, 2009
Source: WRI
Provides tax equity and debt
 
Host
Facility
Manufacturer/
Installer
Investors/
Financial 
Institution
On-site solar
PV system
Financing
Warranties
Project
Developer
sales revenue
ROI
15–20 year PPA
Receives fixed-
price solar power 
No upfront capital 
required
Arranges financing, 
system design, and 
construction
Increased sales of PV panels
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time-value of generation is not transparent in the pricing 
structure or is not rewarded under the net metering scheme. 
With energy prices currently depressed due to the economic 
slowdown, the future electricity purchase costs displaced by 
a PV investment remain unclear. Bankers in the energy 
sector report that, currently, “weak electricity demand has 
made it diffi cult for project developers to lock in long-term 
sales contracts at prices needed to make new wind and solar 
farms profi table.”40 It is evident from discussions with 
companies who have explored investing in PV that the 
incentives necessary to make a project viable involve 
signifi cant legwork and investment in applications and fees. 
These costs are sometimes required even for an uncertain 
outcome in cases where state/utility incentives are awarded 
based on competitive bidding or when incentive programs 
are not fully funded up front to the end of the policy term. 
At best, the regulatory bureaucracy uses staff resources and 
increases the cost of overhead; at worst, it makes incentives 
hard to access and dissuades investment. 
The current cost trajectory for PV module costs indicates 
that PV could eventually provide an affordable option for 
large commercial investors who want to diversify their 
electricity sourcing portfolios with a renewable energy 
source at a predictable price. In the short term, this will 
require continued incentives and fi nancing programs, 
especially in order to spread the installation beyond a few 
leading states. The solar power purchase agreement (see 
Box 2) has been very instrumental in the deployment of 
solar PV observed to date. New business models for PV 
investment, as well as technological improvements on 
panel effi ciency and balance-of-system (BOS) elements 
will be keys to making solar cost effective without incen-
tives in the future. If climate legislation introduces a 
carbon price in the power sector, solar PV will reach “grid 
parity” even faster. The fact that countries with greater 
deployment of PV report lower prices per installed watt is 
an indication that continued investment in the United 
States can help spur further cost reductions which will 
further expand the markets for PV.41 
Regulatory Hurdles for Solar Investments
More than 50 percent of U.S. respondents to the Ernst and 
Young renewable energy corporate survey cite regulatory 
uncertainty (e.g., “lack of clarity as to incentives, pricing 
structure, renewable energy targets”) as a major barrier to 
their investment in renewable energy. Some of the incen-
tives that are needed for PV investments—like the federal 
tax credit and various states’ RECs—are complicated to 
access or have uncertain value.
The renewal of the federal renewable energy tax credit was 
certainly welcomed by the solar industry, but it remains a 
complicated incentive with high transaction costs. The ITC 
allows 30 percent of the value of the capital investment to 
be deducted from the tax burden of the project owner in the 
fi rst year of operation. Project owners put in equity invest-
ment and make returns based on the value of the credit. 
However, to use the tax credit, its owner must have a 
suffi ciently high tax burden to absorb the full value of the 
tax credit in that year, which disqualifi es some companies. 
Most solar developers providing leases or PPAs opt to 
partner with banks that have suffi cient tax appetite and 
capital and that charge fees for structuring and origination 
services. These deals are complicated to structure but are 
fairly low risk for banks. Some large corporate investors 
who have the tax appetite required do take the tax credits 
themselves, but this is very diffi cult or nearly impossible for 
smaller businesses. Thus, while the tax credit is a critical 
incentive for solar deals, it tends to encourage commercial 
investors to rely on large banks for equity investment, 
which is not a smart policy given the recent volatility of the 
banking sector. The cash grant (temporarily) resolves this 
problem, but projects beginning construction after the end 
of 2010 are ineligible for the grant. Without that option, it 
will be more diffi cult fi nding tax equity in a capital market 
that will be even more in demand (and thus costlier). 
Solar PV owners that need to sell sRECs in order to make 
projects viable often fi nd that they are not a very predictable 
source of revenue to count in cash fl ow projections. This is 
true whether the owner is the actual commercial end user or 
a developer providing a PPA. RECs can help on the margin, 
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representing potential upside, but only in some specifi c 
cases can RECs make projects go forward that would not 
have proceeded otherwise. According to Mark Bolinger of 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, “Attractive solar REC 
pricing has emerged in a number of states with solar 
set-asides, but without long-term contracting provisions, 
REC prices will likely remain too uncertain to be factored 
into fi nancing decisions. In other words, without a long-
term contract, neither Tax Investors nor developers nor site 
hosts are likely to fully value this expected revenue stream, 
and instead will consider any upside potential from the sale 
of sRECs to be icing on the cake.”42 Few states (e.g., New 
Jersey, Colorado) allow or require utilities to ensure 
compliance with their RPS by signing long-term REC 
contracts. Companies also experience transaction costs with 
RECs: Monitoring, verifi cation, registration, and negotia-
tions of off-take agreements can add to overhead. For a 
non-energy-sector business, the investment in systems and 
personnel to manage these processes will be spread over a 
relatively small number of MW installed. In states where 
utilities offer rebates for customers investing in solar PV, 
the customer is sometimes required to surrender the REC if 
it receives a rebate.43 Companies who do this can no longer 
claim to be “solar-powered” because they have sold the 
right to the environmental attributes of their solar power 
and any potential claims about it.
Regulation of PV installation and grid interconnection is a 
key area where cumbersome regulation sometimes limits 
project viability and stunts investment. States have 
signifi cant leeway to increase deployment of PV by 
establishing net metering and interconnection policies that 
do not add unnecessary costs and time to a project. They 
can do this by avoiding common pitfalls such as these 
identifi ed by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council—44
• Arbitrary or low limits on the size of the system that can 
interconnect to the network;
• Net-metering schemes that restrict PV system owners 
from being paid for their surplus generation at the same 
time-of-day rates that they would pay for grid power, or 
that credit excess generation against the customer’s bill 
but with time limits to the validity of the credit (i.e. 
restricting “rollover” credits); 
• Requiring or allowing utilities to require unnecessary 
safety measures or technical screening beyond compli-
Table 1 | Summary of Hurdles to U.S. Commercial Investment in PV
Higher Cost of PV PV still has a higher cost than traditional generation sources, especially when the latter do not pay for the societal cost 
of their carbon emissions. PV is only economical in states with strong financial incentives. For direct balance sheet 
investment, the payback period is longer than the investment horizons of most corporate entities. The PPA model can 
help overcome the up-front cost hurdle, but it still requires the same incentives to make the per kWh cost attractive to a 
traditional electricity customer.
Federal Investment Tax Credit 
Makes PV Rely Heavily on Financial 
Services Sector for Equity 
Investments
Tax credits can be used only by companies with sufficient tax appetites. This often requires renewable energy project 
developers to rely on the financial services sector for tax equity investment, which incurs transaction costs and creates 
significant uncertainties about future availability of capital.  The alternative cash grant is currently only available for 
projects beginning construction by the end of 2010.  
Fragmented Demand Rooftop PV installations are inherently of smaller size than other types of power generation, meaning that transaction 
and overhead costs are spread over fewer MW. Commercial investors typically have fragmented demand and therefore 
cannot access aggressive pricing from developers without significant scale. 
REC Value Difficult to Monetize REC markets are illiquid due to states’ definitional differences, and different tracking systems. The value of a REC in most 
markets more than a few years in the future is uncertain, and long-term contracts are thus difficult to secure.
Interconnection and Net Metering 
Regulations
Regulations vary state by state, sometimes by utility. Low limits on the size of the systems that are allowed to intercon-
nect impede scale. Technical requirements are in some cases unnecessarily stringent. Certain states have restricted 
benefits in net metering schemes, limiting the amount of surplus generation which can be sent back on the grid and/or 
not allowing customers to retain credits for surplus generation against their bills beyond a limited time frame.
Local Building Codes Are Not 
Standardized
Codes vary based on municipality, and sometimes prohibit certain types of PV technologies. This complicates feasibility 
screening and increases regulatory risk in development process, making company-wide strategies difficult.
PPA Solar Model Not Available 
Everywhere Due to Legal Challenges
PPA agreements are not legal or are of questionable legality in certain regulated utility states if the PPA provider is not 
regulated by the PUC. 
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ance with the International and National Electrical 
Codes45 for grid-tied systems, which adds cost and time 
to installation;
• Excessively long or unclear processes for evaluating 
system impact and deciding on interconnection approval, 
given that technical standards and procedures such as the 
IEEE 1547 and the National Electrical Code for grid-tied 
systems already exist.
Commercial end users attempting to install PV on their 
roofs have also found that local building codes and 
standards for approved technology vary from city to city. 
This patchwork of local codes complicates efforts to pursue 
a company-wide strategy for PV or to aggregate purchases 
on facilities as close as the nearest town. 
In a number of states, the PPA model is impeded by 
legality issues stemming from language in state legislation, 
state constitutions, or public utility commission decisions.46 
States with regulated, vertically integrated utilities can 
require that any entity that sells power to retail customers 
must be regulated by the public utility commission (PUC). 
These rules were generally not designed to prevent solar 
PPAs, but to protect the customer and ensure safe grid 
operations. Nonetheless, PUC regulation is onerous and 
undermines the solar PPA business model; thus solar PPAs 
are not available in states such as Nevada, Arizona, Florida, 
Colorado, and Texas.47 
UNBLOCKING THE SUN: EMERGING SOLUTIONS 
Solar PV is cost effective today in only a handful of states 
with supportive incentive packages and otherwise high 
electricity prices. Beyond these, a signifi cant gap remains 
between the fi nancial performance of solar deals and the 
acceptable parameters for commercial investors. Large 
commercial investors can leverage their buying power to 
negotiate better panel pricing if they coordinate demand 
across their facilities, but many companies do not have the 
scale of demand or established relationships with equip-
ment providers to do this. The solar industry is currently 
undergoing restructuring and consolidation due to the 
fi nancial crisis, but it remains to be seen whether a more 
vertically integrated industry will emerge as benefi cial to 
the commercial buyer. Changing dynamics in the solar 
industry—and in the larger power markets—make it an 
opportune and necessary time for companies to reevaluate 
their approaches to PV/renewables procurement. 
Solutions to the hurdles discussed above are available and 
ripe for testing and further evolution. For example, a 
collaborative demand aggregation model could help 
currently fragmented segments of the market to access 
better pricing: Potential projects from individual facilities 
(or companies) would be jointly bid out together, generating 
select savings and attracting developers in a larger package. 
To help counteract diffi culties with fi nancing that are 
lingering even as the banking crisis lessens, two innovative 
solutions deserve attention. The results of Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) municipal fi nancing and 
long-term sREC fi nancing programs in a few states could be 
game-changing if they are implemented in the right ways. 
At this stage in the PV markets, it is equally timely for 
policy makers to plan their next steps carefully to encourage 
the long-term cost competitiveness of the industry, eventu-
ally without incentives. Public-sector involvement is 
especially important to make sure that the next generation 
of PV technologies, with potential to sell for less than $1 
per watt, makes it past the technological “valley of death” 
between R&D and the commercial market. Although 
hurdles remain for solar PV, the solutions discussed in this 
section can help accelerate deployment on a wide geograph-
ical scale, avoid bottlenecks, and ensure that it becomes 
economically competitive without fi nancial incentives. 
Financing is slowly returning to the PV market after being 
frozen during the fi nancial crisis, but it is not clear whether 
much capital will again be available at the terms that 
previously fueled the PV boom.48 Financing structures for 
PV have largely evolved to effi ciently capture the value of 
the federal tax credit (currently a large part of project 
revenues). Solar PPAs have been a large part of that 
because they allow a well-capitalized developer to arrange 
tranches of tax equity for relatively small projects, but the 
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developer is another participant in the deal that requires its 
own compensation. Small PV projects do not have access 
to the large banks for tax equity on their own, and with a 
solar PPA they pay no up-front costs. Although they do not 
pay up-front with a solar PPA, they still frequently pay 
more per kWh than they would if they had direct access to 
the same tax equity and fi nanced it on balance sheet, but 
their capital and tax appetites are more limited than those 
of banks.49 The success of the solar PPA shows that 
continued fi nancial innovation is important to continue to 
drive affordability and investments. 
PACE fi nancing is one such innovation that has picked up 
steam in 2009, partly due to the removal of a rule that 
made projects receiving subsidized energy fi nancing 
ineligible for the federal tax credit.50 Thirteen states passed 
laws authorizing these programs at the local level, and 
several municipalities in California and Colorado actually 
established working loan programs (see list in Appendix I). 
PACE loans are commonly made for both solar distributed 
generation and energy effi ciency at attractive rates that 
allow low or no up-front payment.51 The loans are repaid 
through a special assessment on the property and, because 
they involve a lien, can typically only be offered to actual 
property owners. In 2009, the Climate Smart loan program 
in the county of Boulder, Colorado distributed almost $10 
million in loans to property owners for energy effi ciency 
($6.1M) and renewable energy ($3.9M) installations, 
authorizing one quarter of its $40 million initial bonding 
authority allowed by the state.52 As PACE programs are 
piloted across the United States, it is important to monitor 
their results with an eye to commercial applications and 
determine whether there are unique modifi cations that can 
make them more effective for such mid-size investments. 
The lack of liquidity and certainty in most state sREC 
markets makes it diffi cult to monetize their value and 
reduces their effectiveness as a fi nancial incentive. Two 
potential solutions to improve REC markets are being tried 
in New Jersey. To provide longer-term REC price certainty 
to projects and to ensure that utilities are on track to meet 
their solar RPS compliance, the New Jersey state Board of 
Box 3 | Landlords as PPA Providers: A Twist on the PPA Model 
     in New Jersey
Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc., a New Jersey-based real 
estate company, is pioneering a twist on the solar PPA 
sales model. Hartz Mountain, acting as a landlord, is the 
PPA provider and its tenants are the solar customers. By 
investing in five solar installations on properties in its 39 
million-square-foot portfolio, Hartz Mountain added 10 
percent of New Jersey’s total new solar capacity in 2009 
and will produce about four GWh a year from its current 
portfolio.1 There are benefits to such an arrangement for 
the tenants, who can sign a PPA that is coterminous with 
their leases, thereby eliminating the risk that they might 
leave the building before the PPA ends, and they can still 
buy affordable solar power as a hedge against market price 
increases. For Hartz Mountain, the novel solar offering is a 
competitive advantage and it earns a reasonable return on 
investments, thanks in large part to the value of New 
Jersey’s sREC. Hartz Mountain’s installations are partially 
funded by PSE&G’s Solar Loan Program, a pilot solar 
financing program which was approved by the New Jersey 
BPU in April 2009. Under the program, PSE&G can finance 
40 to 60 percent of the cost of panel installation in return 
for the future stream of sRECs generated by the panels. 
PSE&G will provide Hartz Mountain with $1.62 million in 
financing from its $105 million pilot program funds.2 
Hartz Mountain has found that landlords have innate core 
competencies that facilitate solar investments but that 
barriers still remain in the process. As a landlord, Hartz has 
access to 39 million square feet of roof space, as well as 
existing relationships and already established contracts 
with potential customers. As a property management 
company, it has had to build the capacity to evaluate solar 
siting requirements and understand the technology 
performance and risk. Gaining investment certainty over 
solar power’s long investment horizons and structuring 
financial deals that include sometimes uncertain values of 
environmental attributes have also been challenges faced 
in these first initial transactions of the model.3
Notes
1  Hartz Mountain, Ltd., 2010 
2  Lee, 2009
3  McDermott, 2009 
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Public Utilities (BPU) required that they forward contract 
at least a portion of their sRECs rather than just buying on 
the spot market each year.53 The utilities hold competitive 
tenders and projects compete based on their sREC pricing. 
Although RECs are still not a guaranteed revenue stream 
for all New Jersey projects because some projects do not 
win, the long-term contract is signifi cant for those that do. 
Contracts awarded in 2009 averaged slightly over $410 per 
MWh for 10 to 15 years.54 New Jersey sRECs have traded 
high on spot markets ($400 to $600 per MWh),55 but before 
this decision, it was very diffi cult to secure long-term 
contracts for them.
A second and related solution is for the utility to offer 
fi nancing in return for future streams of sRECs. The Public 
Service Enterprise Group (PSEG) of New Jersey is piloting 
a fi nancing program which offers loans for a term of 15 
years that can be paid back by sRECs, and it has demon-
strated success stories (see Box 3).56 In both the fi nancing 
and the long-term contracting programs, the sREC price 
risk is no longer borne by the project developer, and it can 
therefore actually reduce the LCOE or PPA price. These 
two types of programs are possible in regulated states only 
by approval of the state public utilities commission, so the 
New Jersey BPU’s participation was crucial. The New 
Jersey BPU approved the described utility purchasing until 
mid-2012, which leaves the long-term regulatory landscape 
uncertain. If the former illiquidity returns, it could signifi -
cantly damage the New Jersey solar market.
WRI’s Collaborative Solar Initiative (see Box 4) aims to 
develop a demand aggregation business model to reduce 
the cost barriers to PV by capitalizing on returns to scale in 
project economics. Returns to scale are clear in per-watt 
pricing data, and are the result of bulk buying power for 
materials like modules and mounting equipment, as well as 
the ability to spread overhead and transaction costs over a 
larger portfolio and to attract better fi nancing.57 Multi-MW 
systems can access returns to scale, but so can solar deals 
that combine a number of installations on separate facili-
ties. Although not all the cost effi ciencies associated with 
increasing the size of a single installation apply to aggre-
Box 4 | Case Study of WRI Collaborative Solar Pilot Project in 
     California
To test the collaborative demand aggregation model, WRI 
and five Fortune 500 companies undertook a pilot project 
in California in 2009. WRI worked with these five partners 
from the Green Power Market Development Group and the 
Green Power Group California Affiliates1 to map their roof 
space on facilities, prescreen it for PV feasibility, and then 
identified potential clusters where the close proximity 
would allow solar developers to reduce time and labor 
spent in screening and installation. 
With this scoping exercise completed, in April 2009 WRI 
issued a request for proposals (RFP) to solar providers. The 
RFP included 19 facilities within an eight-mile radius, 
representing 1.1 million square feet of roof space from five 
companies. WRI requested contract proposals for 10-, 15-, 
and 20-year terms based on the third-party financing 
model as well as quotes of turnkey installation pricing 
(dollars per watt) for outright system ownership. Ultimately, 
proposals received in response to the Collaborative Solar 
Pilot Project were very encouraging. Prices for 15-year PPAs 
were competitive with average brown power rates. Prices for 
20-year PPAs were below the brown power rates being paid 
by the commercial facilities participating in the RFP. 
Anecdotally, these prices were below the solar power prices 
quoted to companies for 2008 installations of individual 
facilities, even after the CSI rebate in the PG&E utility 
territory stepped down from $.22/kWh to $.16/kWh in 
2009. Due to untimely real estate issues that removed 
several facilities from the cluster, the pilot did not go 
forward in its original grouping. However, it did help 
companies learn about solar purchasing strategies and 
gain experience standardizing their purchasing process. At 
least one Green Power Market Development Group member 
did go ahead with its own multi-facility aggregate invest-
ment in solar PV.2 
Notes
1  http://www.thegreenpowergroup.org/us.cfm
2  Usas, 2010
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gating multiple large installations, some of the benefi ts do 
translate. Effi ciencies in sourcing components, shipping 
and warehousing materials, training labor, and staging 
construction all apply. Additionally, there are real benefi ts 
to the developer of having a single contract that guarantees 
a dozen projects of signifi cant size. 
Innovation in PV technology has powered major cost 
reductions in the past 20 years. Analysis by the Department 
of Energy estimates that the module cost of silicon PV 
panels dropped 87 percent for every doubling of installed 
capacity from 1992 to 2005. 58 This improvement is 
enormous, and there are many technology improvements 
on the horizon, but solar electricity still requires signifi cant 
cost reductions before it is competitive with brown power 
without subsidies and without a price on carbon emissions. 
At current PV conversion effi ciencies, panels would need 
to cost between $1 and $2 per watt installed in order to fall 
below 10 cents per kWh and approach unsubsidized 
competitiveness.59 
Fortunately, panel effi ciencies will not be static, and R&D 
prospects for cheaper modules and innovations on the BOS 
equipment are promising.60 According to DOE Secretary 
Steven Chu, solar PV generation cost will decrease by a 
factor of two within the next fi ve years if suffi cient R&D 
investments are made.61 Promising technologies like 
thin-fi lm PV and building-integrated PV (BIPV) are 
available for commercial use, while others such as concen-
trating PV (CPV) and advanced thin-fi lm alloy cells are 
emerging but are still viewed as riskier and have not 
penetrated the U.S. market.62 Driving down the BOS cost 
will likely entail longer-lasting and panel-integrated 
inverters, more precise power conditioning equipment, and 
reductions on installation cost via system designs that are 
easier to mount, wire, and operate.63 These technologies 
will provide large cost reductions if they can cross over 
from late-stage development to commercial acceptance and 
large-scale manufacturing. The scope and number of the 
technology improvements that are still in the laboratory 
and undergoing pilots make it clear that stable investment 
in research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) is 
crucial for unblocking PV’s long-term success. Both the 
public and private sector can hasten this process by 
proactively investing in RD&D at consistently high levels 
of commitment. It is important that these efforts be 
well-coordinated and that public-private partnerships that 
share technology risk are ramped up. 
CONCLUDING WITH STRATEGIC ACTIONS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH
Deployment in the commercial sector will be crucial to 
expanding PV markets and manufacturing in the United 
States and globally. To install solar power generation 
capacity that makes a serious contribution to decarbonizing 
the U.S. electricity supply (and thereby reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions at a scale that is signifi cant), the commercial 
sector—which consumes 36 percent of U.S. electricity—
must be on board.64 Due to the nature of their real estate 
roof print, commercial end users are also uniquely posi-
tioned to build sizable systems, which drives down cost. 
These end users have the ability to bring a great deal of 
capital to the PV market where there are sound investments 
to be made. Commercial end users can help bring PV to 
scale in these two senses, but their installations are still 
distributed generation, which contributes additional 
benefi ts to grid stability and effi ciency.
The challenges to widening and deepening the commercial 
market for PV are real, but its potential is enormous, and 
the technology continues to progress toward grid parity. To 
accelerate progress toward competitiveness without 
incentives, and to widen the geographical scope of com-
mercial PV deployment, this section recommends actions 
targeted to relevant stakeholders in the effort. 
In publishing this discussion paper, WRI seeks not just to 
recommend strategic actions but to elicit and synthesize 
additional insights about how to scale up solar PV. This type 
of participatory research is especially important at a time 
when the competitive, technological, and policy landscape 
for PV is changing so rapidly. To this end, we conclude with 
questions for key groups of stakeholders in the form of a 
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survey and look forward to receiving responses. We will 
analyze these responses carefully and distill insights for a 
future solar-focused publication as well as using them in 
future initiatives and outreach to the solar industry, com-
mercial end users, and policy-makers. 
• The survey questions are available to complete at: 
http://www.wri.org/publication/whats-blocking-the-sun
• All information submitted will be treated confi dentially 
and will not be associated in any way with identifying 
information about its respondent, except where respon-
dents are grouped and identifi ed by type (i.e. “commer-
cial end users,” “government-affi liated, ” “industry 
members,” or “nonprofi t/academic”).
For Corporate Energy Managers and Financial Officers
Recommended Actions:
1. Perform comprehensive, company-wide initial screening 
of facilities for PV feasibility, including acceptable 
rooftop characteristics, legal/rental tenure, adherence to 
local building codes, and available state incentives.
2. Bid out potential PV projects at proximate facilities to 
developers in a package to capture returns to scale. 
Explore collaborating with other companies that own 
neighboring facilities. 
3. If working with a group of companies on a combined 
purchase, build agreement early on terms that are 
acceptable to the whole group (contract length, preferred 
technology, fi nancial criteria for developer).
4. For sites that are identifi ed, bring facility managers into 
the process early on.
5. If internal capacity exists or could be sourced to perform 
operation and maintenance on solar installations, solicit 
bids from solar developers for turnkey installation or 
leasing options in addition to their PPA proposals. 
6. If considering a large PV investment or a portfolio of 
solar assets on company facilities, calculate the internal 
tax appetite that would be required for the company itself 
to absorb the benefi ts of the ITC. Discuss the potential 
benefi ts to project returns and the feasibility of this 
structuring with the accounting department and/or with 
tax counsel experienced in renewable energy. 
7. When assessing the economic viability of solar PV 
installations, include the best reasonable estimates of the 
value of the associated renewable energy credit (REC), 
and the value of solar power’s peak-time generation.
8. Incorporate risk analysis of traditional energy markets 
when formulating company energy strategies and when 
making solar decisions. Consider quantitatively and 
qualitatively the risks over the 20- to 30-year time 
horizon of not investing in renewable energy and of 
continuing to rely on traditionally generated electricity 
markets, given the specifi c markets on which the 
company/facility relies.
Questions for Corporate Managers:
• In comparing the cost of solar electricity with continued 
grid purchases, what assumptions are made about power 
prices up to 25 years in the future? Are sensitivities 
performed that include the impact of a price on carbon in 
the power sector?
• Which risks related to PV on-site investment is the 
company most equipped to bear? Which is it least 
equipped to bear? (Examples of risks include permitting, 
development risk, resource risk, technology performance 
risk, interest-rate risk for equipment purchase, REC 
price-risk, regulatory risk, etc.)
• Do you use utility rebates if it requires surrendering the 
RECs? How would/do you market the RECs generated 
by the project? Do you retain/retire the project RECs in 
order to claim against renewable energy purchase targets 
or swap solar RECs for national (less valuable) RECs? 
Has your approach changed over the past three years? If 
so, please describe how.
• Are there changes to existing regulations concerning 
RECs (or sRECs) that would increase their value to a 
potential PV project?
• What range of module pricing per installed watt have 
you observed on the market in 2009 or 2010? Have you 
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observed differences in pricing for projects of differing 
sizes?
• What design features need to be included in a federal 
RPS proposal if it is to support solar PV and the market 
for Solar RECs? (Some potential design features include, 
but are not limited to, level of ambitiousness, unbundled 
RECs, solar multipliers, and alternate compliance 
payments at a certain level). 
• What would be a feasible solar carve-out target in a 
federal RPS, achievable without major equipment or 
labor supply bottlenecks, by 2020? 2030?
For Solar Developers and Integrators
Recommended Actions:
1. Continue searching for organizational effi ciencies that 
reduce installation labor time and development costs and 
test new non-module equipment with the potential to 
reduce BOS costs.
2. Prepare for step-downs of incentives paid per kWh in 
leading states like California and New Jersey and 
formulate entry strategies tailored to next markets such 
as Ohio, Colorado, and Pennsylvania.
3. Develop plans for selectively piloting promising PV 
technology beyond crystalline PV in the future, such as 
building-integrated PV, concentrating PV, new inverter, 
or new maximum power point tracking (MPPT) tech-
nologies. Explore joint pilot project options with 
technology manufacturers and guarantees that they could 
provide to share risk. Approach states, national labs, or 
the DOE for R&D funding of public-private partnerships 
to test new technologies on some small percentage of 
project pipeline.
Questions for Solar Industry:
• Where do you see the strongest potential for reduction of 
BOS costs? What types of changes led to the steady 
decline in non-module costs over the past 10 years?
• Which technologies are proven in the lab or fi eld-tested 
but are still considered risky in practice by developers? 
What about by banks? 
• Where is increased R&D most needed to target technol-
ogy gaps?
• Given the state of equity markets today, how important is 
the cash grant? Are there any other potential sources of 
equity that could replace the dominance of banks in the 
RE tax equity space (i.e. pension funds, private equity, 
etc.)?
• Does your cost structure differ dramatically from that 
described for 2008 data on page 3? How has the drop in 
module price changed that cost structure?
• What are the design characteristics of an RPS or REC 
tracking systems that make it easier to monetize the 
value of a REC?
• What are key elements of reasonable interconnection and 
net metering regulations?
• Do you follow the creation of new PACE programs and 
actively plan to target turnkey services to projected 
additional demand in those areas? If not, why?
• Do you see the turnkey model or the PPA model as the 
most viable currently? Do you expect this to change in 
the future or for any other models to dominate?
• What are the drivers/size thresholds for returns to scale 
at the facility level? What are the drivers/size thresholds 
for returns to scale at the deal level?
• How might the economic crisis/increased competition in 
the PV market change your business model, the suite of 
services you offer, or areas of investment in internal 
capacity in the next fi ve years?
For Federal, State, and Local Policy Makers
Recommended Actions:
1. (Federal): Ensure funding for solar incentives beyond the 
expiration horizon of the ARRA so as not to leave solar 
with an “incentive gap.” Include funding that can be 
used by states to maintain funded or to expand success-
ful solar programs. Study extension of the manufacturing 
tax credit and the cash grant program. 
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2. (Federal): Reform the federal tax credits at their next 
renewal to simplify and streamline their application, or 
create a different incentive that companies can directly 
access without an intermediary. 
3. (Federal and state): Establish and maintain strategic 
funds for public-private partnerships to commercially 
demonstrate next-generation PV technologies beyond 
crystalline silicon (i.e., BIPV, CPV, advanced thin fi lm, 
micro invertors, MPPT, and other emerging technolo-
gies).
4. (State): Evaluate state interconnection/net metering 
standards regularly against best practice standards to 
make sure that they facilitate maximum deployment of 
solar energy and avoid the pitfalls identifi ed on page 7. 
5. (State): Allow for the sale of RECs unbundled from 
associated electricity within state RPS to allow sale of 
RECs from distributed generation, and ensure that all of 
the environmental attributes of the REC are clearly 
defi ned. 
6. (State utility boards): Allow and encourage a long-term 
contracting model for regulated utilities to source RECs 
and improve fi nancial viability of RE projects by 
providing long-term REC off-take agreement and/or 
fi nancing program.
7. (Local): Study the benefi ts of and feasibility of a bonding 
initiative to fund a PACE loan program in your jurisdic-
tion. Identify the agencies that would be well-suited to 
administer it.
Questions for Policy Makers:
• Is it possible that solar building codes could be standard-
ized across a state or region? Which agencies and/or 
standards boards would be best suited to making 
suggestions for standardized building codes?
• What are the biggest challenges faced in permitting 
small PV installations? Medium and large size?
• Do states have regular, effective processes to review 
their interconnection and net metering policies against 
accepted best practices? 
• Do public entities in your jurisdiction make solar 
investments? If so, what type of fi nancing model do they 
use? 
• The executive branch recently announced that the federal 
government will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 28 
percent below 2008 by 2020. How will this affect 
investments in renewables by government agencies? 
• How can the federal government and DOE better support 
solar technology in between the demonstration and 
commercialization stages?
• Do your states’ laws, constitution, PUC decisions, and/or 
net metering regulations prevent the sale of electricity 
through third-party power purchase agreements (where 
the PPA provider is not regulated as a utility by the 
PUC)?
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APPENDIX I: ADDITIONAL POLICY INFORMATION
Figure A | Relative Contribution of Federal and State Incentives to Buying Down the Net Installed Cost of PV in 
       Various States
Source: Wiser, et al., 2009
Notes from LBNL: We assume that all systems >10kW are commercial unless identified otherwise, and that direct cash incentives for commercial 
systems are taxed at a Federal corporate tax rate of 35% plus the prevailing state corporate tax rate, and do not reduce the basis of the Federal ITC. 
State ITCs are calculated as described in Appendix C. Results shown for NJ are based solely on systems funded through the CORF program. States are 
excluded from the figure if the database contains fewer than five commercial PV systems installed in that state in 2008.
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in RPS
California 1 1  528.3 A B 33% by 2020 None
New Jersey 2 2  70.2 A B 22.5% by 2021 5,316 GWhs by 2026
Nevada 3 4  35.7 B B 25% by 2025 1.5% solar by 2025
Colorado 4 3  34.2 A B 30% by 2020 3% by 2020
New York 5 6  25.3 D B 24% by 2013 0.13% DG by 2013
Hawaii 6 7  21.9 C F 40% by 2030 None
Connecticut 7 8  13.5 A D 23% by 2020 None
Arizona 8 5  8.8 A C 15% by 2025 4.5% DG by 2025
Massachusetts 9 10  7.7 B B 15% by 2020 400 MW PV by 2020
Oregon 10 9  7.5 A B 25% by 2025 20 MW PV by 2020
Table A. State Rankings in Installation and Policy Indicators
Source: Columns 1 and 2: IREC 2009a. Column 3: Doris et al., 2009. Columns 4 and 5: IREC 2009b. Columns 6 and 7: DSIRE 2010b.
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List of States with Legislation Permitting PACE Programs
As of April 1, 2010, the following states have laws in place 
that give local governments the option to implement a 
PACE program, according to the Database of State Incen-
tives for Renewables and Effi ciency (www.dsireusa.org): 
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Wisconsin. IREC’s 2009 Annual Report cites thirteen states 
that passed legislation allowing local governments to create 
PACE programs from late 2008 to late 2009. 
Nonresidential end users have increasingly dominated PV 
installations since 2002, installing close to twice as much 
PV in 2008 as residential and utility end users combined.65 
Nonresidential installations include commercial end users 
as well as public entities (government, military) but not 
utility installations, whose use of PV only picked up 
recently. This pattern is partly due to the economics of 
larger systems beating residential pricing, but equally 
important has been the fact that the federal tax credit was 
more generous for nonresidential projects until 2009.66 
Figure B | PV Installation by Year and End-User Type
Source: Interstate Renewable Energy Council, 2010
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APPENDIX II: LEVELIZED COST OF ELECTRICIT Y 
CALCULATIONS
The LCOE is calculated using the National Renewable 
Energy Lab’s Solar Advisor Model (SAM).67 Based on 
operating assumptions about the technology, location, cost, 
incentives, and required rates of return, SAM uses a 
discounted cash fl ow model to calculate the LCOE. The 
LCOE is the price per kWh needed for all kWh to cover 
the present value of the total cost of building and operating 
a generating plant, including the cost of capital, over its 
economic life. Costs are levelized in real dollars (i.e., 
adjusted to remove the impact of infl ation).
The baseline results presented in Figure 3 are an approxi-
mate representation of the levelized cost of PV electricity 
in each state without any incentive whatsoever. The 
analysis applies the normal tax rates specifi c to each state 
(corporate, sales, and property) even in states that do 
actually grant tax relief to solar projects, in order to show 
the unsubsidized cost. Figure 4 shows how the LCOE is 
reduced in three scenarios, each with another policy added 
in. The assumed cost per installed watt for all three cases 
shown is $4 per watt, and the baseline is again presented 
incentive-free. The state incentive case includes the effects 
of state tax relief policies applicable to PV as well as 
available state fi nancial incentives (both capacity-based 
and performance-based). The ITC case shows how the 
federal ITC further reduces the LCOE below the state 
incentives and includes both. The REC case further 
includes the value of the REC in the state, based on current 
pricing available or future REC market assumptions as 
necessary. Depreciation schemes are not varied for the 
incentive vs. non-incentive cases but match as closely as 
possible the applicable state depreciation scheme.
Assumptions are drawn from Bolinger (2009) and from the 
default inputs in the Solar Advisor Model where appropri-
ate. Additionally, state-specifi c policy parameters (see table 
below) are drawn primarily from the DSIRE database.68 
These assumptions and scenarios are not to be taken as 
authoritative or specifi c to any particular project but are 
indicative and useful for such a comparative cross-state 
analysis. The project is assumed to be balance-sheet-
fi nanced without project-specifi c debt and must meet the 
specifi ed hurdle rate (here, 10 percent). The locations 
chosen in each state were ranked on the higher end of the 
resources of the sites that had data available in SAM, but 
resources will vary across states. 
Major assumptions common to all cases:
Parameter Value Metric
System Size 149 kW
Lifetime/Analysis Period 25 years
Year Placed in Service 2010 year
Inflation Rate 2.5 %
Company Hurdle Rate 
(Real Discount Rate)
10 %
Federal Corporate Tax Rate 35 %
Insurance 0.5 %
Federal Depreciation MACRS Mid-Quarter 
Convention
Federal ITC 30 %
System Degradation 0.5 % Annually
Availability 100 %
Installed Cost per Watt Pre-sales tax 3 to 5 $/Wdc
O&M Fixed Cost by Capacity 25 $/kW-yr
O&M Escalation (above inflation) 0.5 %
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Assumptions specifi c to state cases:
LONG BEACH, CA NEWARK, NJ DAYTON, OH COLORADO SPRINGS, CO
State Corporate Tax 
Rate (Baseline)1
8.84% 9.00% 0.26% 4.36%
State Corporate Tax 
Rate (PV-applicable)2
Same Same Exemption possible with energy 
conversion facility certificate granted 
by Dept. of Taxation3
Property Tax Rate 
(Baseline)4
0.68% 1.78% 1.81% 1.08%
Note: The incremental cost of 
renewable energy generation 
equipment is exempt from property 
tax. See explanation below.
Property Tax PV 
-Exemption?5
Yes Yes Yes, with energy conversion 
certificate6
Yes
Sales Tax Rate 
(Baseline)7
9.75%8 7.0%9 5.5% 2.9%
Sales Tax PV – Exemp-
tion?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Depreciation 
Scheme
12 years straight line 5-Year MACRS 5-Year MACRS 5-Year MACRS
State CBI ($/W) n/a Only if <50kW10 $3.50/W for traditionally owned 
(not PPA) projects. Maximum of 
$150,000 or 50% of total 
investment11
$2/W provided by the Xcel utility 
program, up to $200,000 
maximum12
State PBI ($/kWh) $0.22/kWh for 5 Years
(valid for projects in SCE region)13
n/a n/a n/a
State REC Value ($/
MWh - taxable)
$2014 $39515 $350 declining to $4316 $65 available in Xcel Solar Reward’s 
Program17
Years of REC Value 15 Years 15 Years 15 Years 20 Years18
Note on REC 
Assumptions
Average of REC prices and term 
quoted by four solar developers in 
the WRI California Solar 
Collaborative Initiative RFP 
Responses.
Value put on sRECs within the 
long-term contracting structures 
available from PSEG.19  Other 
utilities also offer similar programs 
for sRECs at higher prices but 
contract less. These contracts are 
not guaranteed in NJ as they are 
competitively bid.
Ohio has a declining Alternate 
Compliance Payment (see below). 
Assumes that REC prices follow the 
ACP schedule but at a discount to 
be conservative. Current discount to 
ACP is approx. 13%. There is not 
currently a robust long-term market 
for sRECs in OH, i.e., more than a 
few years ahead.
Per the Xcel Solar Reward’s Program
Notes
1. Bolinger, 2009 and The Tax Foundation, 2010
2. DSIRE, 2010b. State summary pages for photovoltaic incentives each indicate where tax exemptions available.
3. DSIRE, 2010c
4. New York Times, 2007
5. DSIRE, 2010b. State summary pages for photovoltaic incentives each indicate where tax exemptions available.
6. DSIRE, 2010c 
7. Federation of Tax Administrators, 2008. Unless otherwise noted in cell.
8. California State Board of Equalization, 2010 
9. DSIRE, 2010b. State summary pages for photovoltaic incentives each indicate where tax exemptions available.
10. Barnes, 2010
11. Milano, Date unspecified
12. Xcel Solar Rewards Program, 2010 
13. Unnamed Author, 2010. Long Beach is in Southern California Edison utility region at Step 5 incentive levels. 
14. Average of REC prices and term quoted by four solar developers in the WRI California Solar Collaborative Initiative RFP Responses.
15. PSEG, 2010
16. DSIRE, 2010d 
17. Xcel Solar Rewards Program, 2010 
18. Xcel Solar Rewards Program, 2010 
19. PSEG, 2010
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Note on Ohio REC Assumptions:
Ohio has a declining Alternate Compliance Payment (see 
below). Assumes that REC prices follow the ACP schedule 
but at the current discount. Current discount to ACP is 
approximately 13% based on the average of year-to-date 
prices listed on the Flett Exchange.69 There is not a robust 
long-term market for sRECs in OH, that is, more than a 
few years ahead. The Ohio RPS includes a provision 
wherein utilities can appeal to the Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Ohio and claim force majeure in the event that they 
can demonstrate that compliance with the solar RPS would 
raise their rates more than 3%. If the commission approves 
such an appeal and “determines that resources suffi cient to 
meet the obligation are not reasonably available,” the 
compliance requirement is waived for the year and 
postponed for subsequent years.70 All of these uncertainties 
combine to make the Ohio sREC value very diffi cult to 
forecast, so it must be emphasized that the value calculated 
for the Ohio RECs is a rough estimate of the potential 
value and is far from guaranteed.
Colorado Property Tax Assumptions:
Colorado’s property tax is not levied on the incremental 
cost of a renewable power generation system. According to 
DSIRE (2010e), the latest “nonrenewable facility value 
was determined to be $1,128 per kilowatt (KW) for 
renewable energy projects up to 2 megawatts (MW).” 
Therefore, the property tax rate is calculated on that $1,128 
per MW only.
ENDNOTES (Correspond to Bibliography) 
1. Wiser et al., 2009
2. EIA, 2009. Refers to retail sales of electricity only.
3. Combined Average Growth Rate (CAGR) from 2000-2008.
4. GreenTech Media, 2009a and IREC, 2009a
5. IREC, 2009a
6. IREC, 2010
7. IREC, 2010
8. Eurobserv’er, 2009
9. California has an aggressive RPS but no specific solar provision 
within it. To date, the statewide RPS has not been a key driver for 
solar rooftop PV installations because it did not allow utilities to buy 
RECs without buying the associated power, and hence they have built 
more utility-scale solar to meet the RPS. This rule was changed in 
2009, so the state will now allow distributed rooftop solar PV value 
to have a role in meeting the RPS.
10. IREC, 2009b
11. Polysilicon is used to make crystalline silicon PV panels.
12. Navigant, 2010 
13. Seeking Alpha, 2009 
14. Wiser et al., 2009
15. Non-module costs are also sometimes referred to as the “balance of 
system,” but that term technically does not include overhead.
16. Wiser et al., 2009. This was observed for 10 years (between 1998 and 
2008). 
17. For commercial projects larger than 100 kW whereas residential 
prices were slightly higher, LBNL notes that these costs are 
provisional and anecdotal industry sources suggest they may have 
come down even further for projects in 2010.
18. Chu, 2010
19. Regions/states with average commercial electricity prices (in 2009) at 
or above 10 cents per kWh included New England, the Mid Atlantic, 
the West Coast, Hawaii, and Alaska. Sunny, in this case, is defined as 
approximately 1,350 kWh/kW per year.
20. Wiser et al., 2009
21. Bolinger, 2009. sRECs represent 1 MWh (or the energy equivalent of 
1 MWh) of solar energy generated. They can be used to comply with 
separate solar provisions or “carve-outs” in state renewable portfolio 
standards. sRECs can be awarded to solar electricity and/or solar 
thermal energy, depending on the specific technologies’ eligibility in 
the state RPS.
22. SEIA, 2009
ACP
Trading at today’s 
discount (13% )
2009 450 13%
2010 400 350
2011 400 350
2012 350 306
2013 350 306
2014 300 263
2015 300 263
2016 250 219
2017 250 219
2018 200 175
2019 200 175
2020 150 131
2021 150 131
2022 100 88
2023 100 88
2024 50 44
2025 50 44
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23. Bolinger, 2010
24. SEIA, 2009
25. Photon News, 2009
26. Greentech Media, 2009b 
27. This policy update only covers September 2008 to September 2009.
28. IREC, 2009a
29. IREC, 2009a
30. Including $16.8 billion for energy efficiency and renewable energy, 
$4 billion for renewable energy loan guarantees, $4.5 billion for smart 
grid and transmission, and $2 billion for R&D, including the ARPA-E 
program.
31. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2010
32. Ernst and Young, 2009
33. Ernst and Young, 2009
34. LCOE is the per-unit life-cycle cost of one kWh. It is the price per 
kWh needed to cover the present value of the total cost of building 
and operating a power plant, including the cost of capital, over its 
economic life. Costs are levelized in real dollars (i.e., adjusted to 
remove the impact of inflation).
35. Installed cost here refers to all-in cost per watt, before sales tax.
36. Average costs are illustrative. A better comparison would take into 
account the time-of-use rates for commercial buyers whose pricing 
structures are based on those rates, given the fact that solar generates 
close to peak load.
37. Bolinger, 2009 
38. NREL, 2010a
39. The Ohio RPS includes a provision wherein utilities can appeal to 
the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio to claim force majeure in 
the event that they can demonstrate that compliance with the solar 
RPS would raise their rates more than 3 percent. If the commission 
approves such an appeal and “determines that resources sufficient 
to meet the obligation are not reasonably available,” the compliance 
requirement is waived for the year and postponed for subsequent 
years. New Jersey has a similar clause if the total cost of solar 
incentives during a reporting year exceeds 2 percent of the total retail 
price of electricity in that year. All of these uncertainties combine to 
make sREC values very difficult to forecast, so it must be emphasized 
that the value assumed for the sRECs is a rough estimate of the 
potential value and is far from guaranteed.
40. Daily, 2010 
41. Wiser et al., 2009
42. Bolinger, 2009
43. Kollins, 2008
44. IREC, 2010b
45. Specifically, the IEEE 1547 and the National Electrical Code.
46. Kollins, 2008
47. In Texas, this has been an issue in municipal utility service territories.
48. Bolinger, 2009
49. Bolinger, 2009 
50. IREC, 2009a
51. IREC, 2009a
52. Livingston, 2009
53. New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, 2008
54. New Jersey Office of Clean Energy, 2010
55. DSIRE, 2010a
56. PSEG, 2010 
57. Wiser et al., 2009. The difference between small systems (<2 kW) 
and medium-large systems (>500 kW) was more than $2 per watt 
installed.
58. U.S. DOE, 2006. The equivalent progress ratio for panels is slightly 
lower at 81 percent. Data were only through 2005, however; both 
silicon and thin-film technologies have further reduced in cost since 
then. 
59. This statement refers to competitiveness with today’s power prices 
although the authors note the likelihood that prices increase in the 
future.
60. U.S. DOE, 2006 and Keyes et al., 2008.
61. Chu, 2010
62. Zwiebel, 2010 
63. Chu, 2010. Sullivan, 2009. PV World, 2010. 
64. EIA, 2009. Refers to retail sales of electricity only.
65. IREC, 2009a
66. Wiser et al., 2009
67. NREL, 2010a
68. DSIRE, 2010b
69. Flett Exchange, 2010
70. DSIRE, 2010d
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